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SELLING THE IDEA TO TELL THE TRUTH: 
THE PROFESSIONAL INTERROGATOR 
AND MODERN CONFESSIONS LAW 
Joseph D. Grano* 
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d edition). By Fred 
E. Inbau, John E. Reid, and Joseph P. Buckley. Baltimore: Williams 
& Wilkins. 1986. Pp. xvii, 353. $28.50. 
Of necessity, therefore, interrogators must deal with criminal sus-
pects on a somewhat lower moral plane than that upon which ethical, 
law-abiding citizens are expected to conduct their everyday affairs. That 
plane, in the interest of innocent suspects, need only be subject to the 
following restriction: Although both "fair" and "unfair" interrogation 
practices are permissible, nothing shall be done or said to the suspect 
that will be apt to make an innocent person confess. [p. xvii] 
I share the view that not many innocent men (at least those of aver-
age intelligence and educational background) are likely to succumb to 
these "methods of debatable propriety." But how many innocent men 
are likely to be subjected to these methods? How "tough" would the 
American lawyer's reaction be if he had some notion of "the price" we 
pay in terms of human liberty and individual dignity?1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The third edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions is a 
book in two parts. The first part, an instruction manual, strives to 
teach professional interrogators how to obtain a confession from a 
guilty suspect who is not inclined to confess. The second part contains 
an analysis of the law pertaining to police interrogation. Touted as 
"an entirely new book" (p. v), the third edition, particularly in the first 
part, actually replicates much of what is found in the earlier editions. 
The organization, however, is much more elaborate: while the second 
edition, for example, simply listed from A to Z the tactics and tech-
niques for successful interrogation,2 the third edition has rearranged 
• Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1965, J.D. 1968, Temple 
University; LL.M. 1970, University of Illinois. - Ed. · 
1. Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession: Some Comments on lnbau and Reid's 
Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 732 (1963) (emphasis in 
original) (footnote omitted). 
2. F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS ix-x (2d ed. 1967). 
Joseph Buckley did not join the book until the third edition. 
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these tactics into "nine steps to effectiveness" (pp. 77-84).3 Beginning 
with immediate efforts to "disarm" the suspect from the moment the 
interrogator is introduced (p. 84-85), moving deliberately to the "criti-
cal stage" when the increasingly apprehensive suspect has become in-
decisive about whether he should continue to lie (p. 159), proceeding 
quickly thereafter to the suspect's first admission of guilt (pp. 165-70), 
and concluding with a detailed oral and then written confession (pp. 
171-78), the new organization offers the interrogator'·a systematic 
strategy for "selling the suspect on the idea to tell the truth" (p. 154). 
While the authors' suggested interrogation tactics, even if refined 
and rearranged, have remained largely the same, each edition of this 
book has come forward against a different backdrop of constitutional 
law. Because then prevailing due process doctrine made denial of 
counsel merely one factor to consider in a voluntariness determina-
tion, 4 the first edition, published in 1962, appropriately could suggest 
means to dissuade a suspect from persisting in an expressed desire to 
remain silent or to consult a lawyer.5 Escobedo v. Illinois 6 and Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 7 however, 'prompted a second edition just five years 
later. Although the embittered authors conceded that the police had a 
legal and moral obligation to comply with the strictures of these new 
cases, they also insisted that most of the first edition's tactics still 
could be used after such compliance.8 Nevertheless, the authors had 
doubts and fears: 
If we are in error with regard to our interpretation of the Miranda 
case, then the Supreme Court has but orie more move to make, and that 
is to outlaw all interrogations of criminal suspects. We say this because 
of our confidence that effective interrogations can only be conducted by 
such procedures as the ones we herein describe. 9 
As the authors recognize in the preface to the third edition, the law 
governing police interrogation has changed considerably since they ex-
pressed these fears (p. v). Miranda remains alive, but the present 
Supreme Court has signaled clearly that it will not make "one more 
3. The second step, "theme development," offers eleven themes for the interrogator to de-
velop, pp. viii-ix; each was presented as a "tactic" or "technique" in the second edition. Id. The 
authors have summarized the nine steps on a small card that accompanies the book. W.hile 
convenient, the card is less wieldy than the Miranda cards the police often carry. 
4. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). 
5. F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 111-12 (1962). 
6. 378 U.S. 478 (1964)(recognizing sixth amendment right to counsel, at least upon request, 
during custodial police interrogation). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with its much 
broader holding, quickly eclipsed Escobedo. While Escobedo's result would remain the same 
today under Miranda, the Court is now of the view that Escobedo should have been decided on 
fifth and not sixth amendment grounds. See note 19 infra and accompanying text. 
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (promulgating, pursuant to the fifth amendment, elaborate warning 
and waiver requirements prior to custodial interrogation). 
8. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 2, at 1. 
9. Id.,- see also id. at 195-97 (expressing some concern that the Court might prohibit police 
trickery). 
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move" to eliminate police interrogation. 10 Indeed, those who worship 
at Miranda's shrine view several of the Court's recent decisions as the 
prelude to Miranda's ultimate demise. 11 Emboldened by these recent 
developments, the authors now confidently urge the police to read Mi-
randa more narrowly than they suggested in the second edition. 12 
While the authors have good reason for much of their confidence, 
the third edition nevertheless should leave informed readers with an 
uneasy sense that a fundamental tension exists between the book's sug-
gested tactics and the underlying principles, if not the most recent 
holdings, of modern confessions law. The interrogation tactics the au-
thors advocate do not comfortably coexist with the normative founda-
tions of cases like Escobedo and Miranda, even as narrowly read. 
Similarly, as the introductory quotations to this essay illustrate, the 
philosophy of the authors is poles apart from that of Miranda's most 
passionate defenders, such as Professor Yale Kamisar. 13 While the 
authors continue to insist on compliance with Miranda, their view of 
the function and proper scope of police interrogation is clearly not the 
view of Miranda and its defenders. 14 
The present Supreme Court would not have spawned Miranda. 
Nevertheless, perhaps because of institutional considerations, the 
Court seems disinclined to take the drastic step of overruling Miranda 
and rethinking the basic premises of confessions law. Although judi-
cial restraint is usually praiseworthy, in this context it can only assure 
continuation of the tension between Miranda's philosophical assump-
tions and those that to a large extent the present Court and the au-
thors share. Moreover, the Court's failure to resolve this tension 
increases the likelihood that a future Court will take the step that wor-
ried the authors twenty years ago, for someday the tension will have to 
be resolved. 
10. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986). 
11. See, e.g., Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?}, The Burger 
Court (Is It Really, So Prosecution Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices in THE BURGER 
COURT: THE COUNTER REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 82-86 (V. Blasi ed. 1983); Stone, The 
Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99. But see Kamisar, supra at 86-90. 
As a critic of Miranda, I recently have argued that the Court has undermined Miranda's legiti-
macy by its current understanding of what it did in that case. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in 
Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, SO Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985). 
12. For example, the recommended warnings and waiver procedure are not as explicit and 
detailed as in the second edition. Compare pp. 229-30 with F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 2, at 
181-82. In addition, the authors now emphasize that police should not repeat or embellish the 
warnings, give them prematurely, or substitute written for oral waivers. Pp. 220-32. 
13. See note 1 supra and preceding text. Over the years, Professor Kamisar has been Profes-
sor Inbau's most persistent critic. See Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau: "The Importance of Being 
Guilty," 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1977). Professor Kamisar's writings on confession 
law are collected and updated in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 
(1980). 
14. Miranda's extensive criticism of the first edition of the authors' book makes this appar-
ent. See 384 U.S. at 448-55 & nn.9-23. 
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In section II of this essay, I attempt to illustrate the tension be-
tween the authors' suggested tactics and the premises of modern con-
fessions law. My purpose is to show that the authors' approach to 
police interrogation is pervasively, not just occasionally, inconsistent 
with both strands of thought that have influenced current legal doc-
trine. Section III critiques these two strands of thought and argues 
that the tension should be resolved by rejecting the premises of mod-
ern confessions law. is 
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL INTERROGATION AND 
THE PREMISES OF MODERN CONFESSIONS LAW 
Putting aside specific doctrinal holdings and concentrating on phil-
osophical underpinnings, two strands of thought have influenced mod-
ern confessions law. The first, most apparent in sixth amendment 
cases but infecting fifth amendment cases as well, is that a suspect 
needs and should have assistance in matching wits with the police dur-
ing interrogation.16 The second, most prevalent in fifth amendment 
cases, is that a custodial suspect needs and should have protection 
against the pressures to confess that are generated by interrogation. 
For those who typically applaud Warren Court decisions, these 
strands are not separate and independent but rather interrelated ex-
pressions of what human dignity requires.17 
15. This essay does not review the authors' legal analysis in part two of the book. It should 
be noted, however, that this part of the book is not completely satisfactory. First, although 
chapter eight is intended for nonlawyers and chapter nine for prosecutors, p. xiii, the chapters are 
equally lacking in depth and largely repetitious. Second, the authors' treatment of the law is 
sometimes confusing if not misleading. For example, they continue to suggest, contrary to the 
facts, that the old due process voluntariness test was based on the concern of excluding untrust-
worthy confessions. Pp. 246-47. In addition, they fail to distinguish clearly fifth and sixth 
amendment cases, pp. 238, 295, 303, even though the Court's doctrine in these two areas is 
different. Their repeated discussion of Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (sixth amend· 
ment holding) in the context of Miranda issues is particularly distracting. 
As an overview for police officers, the authors' legal analysis may be sufficient. Unfortu-
nately, the authors could have done much more to support their philosophy of police 
interrogation. 
16. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court's primary concern was the pres-
ence of "compulsion," but the concern discussed in the text is also apparent. For example, the 
Court frowned on the use of trickery. 384 U.S. at 451-53. It also expressed concern about the 
suspect's ability to make an "intelligent" decision whether to remain silent, a decision in which 
he would appreciate the consequences of agreeing to talk. 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Court sug-
gested that the suspect should be reminded that the police are not acting solely in his interest, 
and it opined that those who do not request counsel typically are most in need of counsel's 
assistance. 384 U.S. at 469-71. Miranda's defenders similarly combine a concern about compul-
sion with a concern about the suspect making an intelligent, rational choice. See the authorities 
cited in note 17 infra. 
The Court today is much less inclined to mix sixth amendment concerns in its fifth amend-
ment analysis. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (failure of police to inform suspect 
that lawyer wanted to see him does not invalidate Miranda waiver or otherwise violate 
Constitution). 
17. See, e.g., Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Jnterrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. 
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A. Police Interrogation and Intelligent Choice 
Although Escobedo v. Illinois 18 has little vitality today as a sixth 
amendment case, 19 its reasoning, which illustrates the first strand of 
modem confessions thinking, still exerts influence. After the police 
confronted Escobedo with an accomplice who accused him of the fatal 
shooting, Escobedo responded that the accomplice, not he, had fired 
the shots. The Supreme Court sympathetically observed that Esco-
bedo as a layman undoubtedly was unaware that his admission of 
complicity was as damaging as an admission that he had fired the fatal 
shots. 20 The Court stated that Escobedo needed counsel's legal aid and 
advice, because what resulted during the interrogation could affect the 
later trial.21 Absent the right to counsel's advice, the trial would be 
"no more than an appeal from the interrogation," with conviction vir-
tually assured by the suspect's confession. 22 
We can appreciate how remarkable this reasoning is only by focus-
ing clearly on the evils the Court identified as warranting relief. The 
primary evil is the suspect making an uninformed and unintelligent 
decision to confess. To assure an informed and intelligent decision, 
one that comports with the suspect's best interests, counsel should be 
present to provide aid and advice. A second evil is the police obtaining 
evidence from the suspect that will help assure his conviction. The 
suspect will not have much chance of mounting an effective defense at 
trial - that is, of winning an acquittal - if he confesses, and for some 
reason, not articulated, this is undesirable even when the suspect is 
guilty.23 
If these concerns are legitimate, the tactics the authors advocate 
should have no place in our law. Indeed, if one takes Escobedo 's rea-
soning seriously, all police interrogation should be prohibited until the 
defendant has had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer. Under 
Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 1, 42 n.174 (1978); White, Police Trickery i11 Inducing Confessions, 
127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979); see also Y. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 211-24. 
18. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
19. Since Escobedo, the Court has held that sixth amendment rights attach not at custody but 
only at or after the start of adversary judicial proceedings. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 
1135 (1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); see also Grano, Rhode Island v. 
Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. l, 5-31 (1979) (reviewing the Court's cases). The demise of Escobedo as a 
sixth amendment case actually occurred in Miranda. See id. at 6 n.38. Escobedo's reasoning still 
controls sixth amendment analysis, however, when the interrogation occurs after the start of 
adversary judicial proceedings. See Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404 (1986). 
20. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486. 
21. 378 U.S. at 486-89. 
22. 378 U.S. at 487-88. 
23. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1438-43 (1985). Escobedo 
also referred to the danger of compulsory self-incrimination. See 378 U.S. at 488-89. This facili-
tated the Court's subsequent reinterpretation of Escobedo as a fifth amendment case. See note 19 
supra. 
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Escobedo 's constitutional vision, we cannot rest comfortably with a 
system that permits the availability of legal assistance to turn on the 
suspect's hurried response to a less than enthusiastic police warning. 
Indeed, the procurement of legal advice must depend in such a system 
more on chance than on a reasoned exercise of judgment. 24 Of course, 
as the authors and others know, provision of counsel to all defendants 
before interrogation would facilitate intelligent choice only by virtu-
ally eliminating the possibility of confessions, for the only advice a 
competent lawyer typically will give, particularly if the suspect is 
guilty, is not to make a statement.25 This, however, is the necessary 
price of taking Escobedo seriously. 
To avoid having to justify either Escobedo's premises or our toler-
ance of unexacting waivers, some may be willing to accept the present 
system as an uneasy compromise between the logical ramifications of 
these premises and the feared elimination of police interrogation. 
Those with this understanding may think it more productive to use 
Escobedo 's reasoning to identify interrogation tactics that undermine 
the suspect's ability to appreciate the significance of an admission or 
confession. The contradictions in modern confessions law, however, 
cannot be avoided by this strategy, for candid analysis necessitates the 
conclusion that Escobedo 's reasoning prohibits not just certain interro-
gation tactics but interrogation itself. 
The authors' book illustrates this point. The tension between Esco-
bedo and the authors' philosophy does not arise in isolated passages 
that graphically depict successful strategies of deceit and trickery but 
rather permeates the entire book. In the Preface, for example, Inbau 
praises Reid, his now deceased coauthor, as an interrogation specialist 
who "personally trained many persons to become excellent interro-
gators" (p. v). Similarly, the authors argue that ideally only intelligent 
officers who have studied "the art of criminal interrogation" should be 
permitted to conduct interrogations (p. 35). An intelligent, well-
trained interrogator, however, is likely to convince a guilty suspect to 
tell the truth, a decision that will help assure conviction and that the 
suspect typically will come to regret. In the battle of wits, the profes-
sional interrogator trained in psychology is more likely than the un-
trained officer to outsmart the suspect and obtain an incriminating 
statement. Under Escobedo 's reasoning, an excellent, professional in-
terrogator should be deplored rather than applauded. 
The professional interrogator is only the first difficulty. In the 
name of human dignity, academic commentators frequently denounce 
24. Cf. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 21, 40-41 (1961) (effectiveness of warning depends upon its em-
phasis and spirit). 
25. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). A confession in a 
plea bargaining context may be advantageous, but a confession to the police typically is not in the 
suspect's interest. 
668 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:662 
as improper interrogation tactics that take advantage of inexperienced 
and ignorant suspects.26 Undoubtedly to the consternation of such 
critics, the authors demonstrate in their book that morally neutral pro-
cedures, which no one would condemn, and courteous, polite proce-
dures, which critics would applaud, have as their purpose and effect 
the same function of outwitting the suspect. For example, the authors 
instruct the interrogator not to take notes, for taking notes "may 
grimly remind the suspect of the legal significance or implication of an 
incriminating remark" (p. 36). They insist that the interrogator 
should wear civilian clothes, for otherwise "the suspect will be re-
minded constantly of police custody and the possible consequence~ of 
an incriminating disclosure" (p. 36). They even warn against bad 
breath, distracting facial appearances, and clothing disarray, for all of 
these may annoy or distract the suspect and reduce "the effectiveness 
of an interrogation" (pp. 37-38). If the authors' advice is sound, those 
who aim to protect the suspect's ability to act in his best interests 
should insist that only inexperienced, disheveled, uniformed officers, 
with garlic on their breath, conduct interrogations. 
The authors also admonish the interrogator to be polite and cour-
teous to the suspect. For example, the interrogator should use the 
suspect's last name, preceded by Mr., Mrs., or Miss, particularly if the 
suspect has a low economic status (pp. 38-39). By thus flattering the 
person and providing him a sense of dignity from such unaccustomed 
courtesy, "the interrogator will enhance the effectiveness of whatever 
he says or does thereafter" (p. 39). To illustrate the importance of 
courteous behavior, the authors tell of a murder suspect whom a po-
lice officer inappropriately addressed as an "old whore." To counter 
this negative tactic, and to win the suspect's confidence, the interroga-
tor (one of the authors) displayed respect and concern for the suspect. 
Thus, upon learning that she had not eaten, he obtained food for her. 
By treating her "as a 'lady,' " he soon had the desired confession (pp. 
39-40). Similarly, the authors instruct the interrogator not to use de-
rogatory names, even in jest, toward homosexuals or racial minorities 
(pp. 40, 199). Indeed, in dealing with a homosexual, "[i]t is much 
more effective" for the interrogator to act as if homosexuality is 
morally acceptable (pp. 40, 99). The skillful interrogator must 
"[r]ecognize that in everyone there is some good," for the suspect's 
good characteristics can be utilized in the effort for a successful inter-
rogation (p. 42). 
While many will applaud this advice, the authors offer it not be-
cause they believe such police behavior is morally mandated but be-
cause such behavior will help the interrogator to obtain a confession. 
26. See Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARYL. REV. 
15, 40-41 (1981); Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modem Law of Confes-
sions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275; see also White, supra note 17. 
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As candidly stated in an appendix reviewing the psychological princi-
ples of police interrogation, the goal of the entire interrogation process 
is "to decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of confess-
ing" (p. 332).27 This is precisely what Escobedo and Miranda aimed to 
combat28 and what the defenders of these cases excoriate. 
To be sure, most of the authors' suggested stratagems are not so 
benign. Having directly confronted the suspect with belief in his giiilt 
at the beginning of the interrogation (pp. 84-93), the interrogator 
should next develop a "theme," which either will present a moral ex-
cuse for the crime or minimize its moral implications (p. 93). Possible 
themes include, among others, that anyone under similar conditions 
would have done the same thing (pp. 97-99), that the suspect had a 
more acceptable motivation for the crime than the one actually 
surmised (pp. 102-06), that others, including the victim, deserve con-
demnation (pp. 106-18), and that the victim or witnesses must be exag-
gerating (pp. 120-25). By seeking to convince the suspect that he is 
less morally reprehensible than the facts of the case indicate, the vari-
ous themes "establish the psychological foundation to achieve an im-
plicit, if not explicit, early, general admission of guilt" (p. 97). If the 
suspect denies the crime, the interrogator may use a "baiting" ques-
tion, such as "Jim, is there any reason you can think of why one of 
Mary's neighbors would say your car was seen parked in front of her 
home that night?" Not knowing whether his car was seen, the sus-
pect, if he is guilty, must decide whether to deny or explain this accu-
sation; either way, he runs the risk of being caught in a lie (pp. 68-
73).29 
The authors' case examples illustrate the significance of deceit in 
the interrogation process. In one case, an interrogator told a seven-
teen-year-old arrested for rape that the youth hardly could avoid what 
he did; the interrogator also stated that he too, as a boy in high school, 
had "roughed it up" with a girl attempting to have intercourse. The 
boy, who thereafter confessed, was so relieved that he later explained 
to his father that the interrogator had once done the same thing (p. 
98). In a child molestation case, the interrogator suggested that the 
child was well advanced for her age and probably tried to excite the 
suspect (p. 108). The authors contend that the same tactic frequently 
27. The Appendix, twenty pages entitled "The Psychological Principles of Criminal Interro-
gation," was authored by Brian C. Jayne, who is Director of the Reid College of Detection of 
Deception. Pp. 327-47. 
28. With regard to Miranda and this concern, see note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
29. Similarly, if Jim says he was out driving on a certain road, the interrogator can ask him 
about a fictitious accident that interfered with traffic. If Jim has been lying, he now faces a 
dilemma: if he denies observing the accident and it occurred, the interrogator will have caught 
him in a lie; if he admits observing the accident and it did not occur, the interrogator again will 
have caught him in a lie. P. 74. Although I have stated in the text that this tactic is less benign 
than those previously discussed, I cannot comprehend why anyone would object to it. 
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is successful in rape cases (pp. 108-09).30 While this strategy of cast-
ing blame on innocent victims may seem of doubtful utility, the .au-
thors maintain that it works because offenders want to blame their 
victims for their crimes (p. 108). 
The authors indicate that the interrogator may ease certain sus-
pects into an admission by suggesting excuses like accident, intoxica-
tion, or self-defense (pp. 102-03, 166). Indeed, the seventh step in the 
interrogation plan is to offer the suspect an alternative question, one 
that presents a choice between a repulsive motivation for the crime 
and an error attributable to human frailty (p. 165). Once the suspect 
makes an admission, the interrogator should begin to develop a de-
tailed and true account. Often the interrogator will have to persuade 
the suspect to abandon the moral excuse that he successfully used to 
prompt the suspect's first admission (pp. 103, 173). Even if the sus-
pect does not abandon this excuse, the inconsistency between his origi-
nal denial and the assertions in his confession will make the excuse 
seem implausible at trial (p. 104). In developing a full confession, the 
interrogator should abandon his earlier reluctance to use words that 
might conjure up the legal consequences of confessing, like burglary 
and rape (pp. 37, 85). With an admission in hand, the interrogator 
now freely should use such descriptive words "so that when these 
words are used in the formal written confession, the suspect will be 
accustomed to them" (p. 172). 
Whatever one thinks of these tactics, they all have the objective 
previously mentioned: to convince a suspect who is not so inclined to 
abandon a false denial and to admit the truth (p. 154). Telling the 
truth, however, typically is not in the best interests of guilty suspects. 
In terms of preserving defenses for trial or a position of strength for 
plea bargaining, the rational, intelligent course of action for a guilty 
suspect, assuming he chooses to respond at all, is to persist in a denial 
of the crime.31 Thus, if we were serious about enabling the suspect to 
protect his best interests during police interrogation, everything the 
authors recommend, from insincere politeness to overt trickery, would 
be disallowed. 
Of course, some of the authors' tactics may seem more offensive 
than others. Although, as the authors demonstrate, the issue of what 
is offensive may be debatable, most would agree, at least in concept, 
that truly offensive interrogation techniques should be prohibited. 
Once distinctions are made on grounds of perceived offensiveness, 
however, it must be conceded that protection of the suspect's ability to 
appreciate the significance and consequences of his actions is not our 
30. During interrogation, the goal is not to defend the victim's honor, protect the victim's 
sensibilities, or vindicate the themes of law and order; the goal is to persuade the guilty suspect to 
confess. Once the suspect confesses, of course, these other concerns will be satisfied. 
31. Of course the most intelligent course of action is simply to refuse to answer questions. 
February-April 1986] Interrogation and Confessions 671 
real concern. At least this must be conceded absent empirical evi-
dence that "offensive" tactics outwit the suspect more successfully 
than inoffensive ones. 
To shift the legal focus from the suspect's ability to make an intelli-
gent choice to offensive police tactics is to move in the direction of 
vindicating the authors' position on police interrogation. First, such a 
shift eliminates Escobedo 's line of argument for a right to counsel's 
assistance during police interrogation. While counsel may be neces-
sary to ensure intelligent choice, counsel is not necessary to prohibit 
offensive interrogation techniques: neutral observers behind one-way 
mirrors could accomplish such a limited goal. Second, such a shift in 
the legal concern resolves some of the tension and contradictions in 
the status quo. It does this by denying Escobedo's unsupported prem-
ise that an evil occurs whenever an interrogator outsmarts the defen-
dant by persuading him to admit, truthfully and against his best inter-
ests, involvement in the crime. 
B. Police Interrogation and Compulsion 
Although Miranda v. Arizona 32 reflects some of Escobedo 's reason-
ing, it primarily illustrates the second strand of modem confessions 
thinking - the desire to protect the suspect from compulsion. While 
the due process voluntariness doctrine always reflected this concern, 33 
Miranda for the first time viewed as evil the mere "inherent compul-
sion" of custodial interrogation.34 As Justice Harlan's dissent demon-
strated, before Miranda the Court had not read the fifth amendment as 
prohibiting "all pressure to incriminate one's self";35 rather, the 
Court's concern had been "to sift out undue pressure, not to assure 
spontaneous confessions."36 
The Miranda Court viewed the warnings it promulgated and the 
waiver requirements it imposed as "protective devices" that would 
"dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."37 Of 
course, contradictions immediately were apparent. If a simple re-
sponse to a single custodial question must be viewed as presumptively 
compelled, the possibility of having a voluntary waiver is difficult to 
understand.38 Similarly, if the right to counsel's presence in this fifth 
amendment sense arises because "[t]he circumstances surrounding in-
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
33. See generally Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. 
REV. 859, 874-80, 896-909 (1979). 
34. 384 U.S. at 458, 467, 468, 478. 
35. 384 U.S. at 512 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
36. 384 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
37. 384 U.S. at 458. 
38. 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). The incongruities help explain why the present 
Court has found it so easy to read Miranda as having promulgated a mere "prophylactic rule," 
one designed to combat the potential for compulsion rather than actual compulsion. While such 
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custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of 
one merely made aware of his privilege,"39 allowing the defendant to 
subject himself to such overbearing pressures by waiving his rights is 
incomprehensible. One can comprehend the concept of waiver with 
respect to rights such as trial by jury, but as Justice Marshall re-
marked in a different context, "no sane person would knowingly relin-
quish a right to be free of compulsion."40 Apart from whether a sane 
person would make such a waiver, no decent system of law would 
permit a person to relinquish his right not to be subject to pressures 
that overbear the will. 41 Finally, even if the concern is an "intelligent 
decision" with regard to the exercise of fifth amendment rights, 42 the 
likelihood of achieving intelligent choice when the waiver decision 
must be made quickly in the police station is small. 43 
Inherent compulsion is the compulsion that is present in any custo-
dial interrogation. If inherent compulsion is an evil to be eradicated, it 
must follow that any additional pressures the police bring to bear upon 
the suspect also are impermissible. As before, however, this cannot be 
taken seriously unless one is prepared to prohibit all custodial ques-
tioning by a professional interrogator. For if the first goal of the skill-
ful interrogator is "to decrease the suspect's perception of the 
consequences of confessing,"44 the second is to "increas[e] the sus-
pect's internal anxiety associated with his deception" (p. 332). 
The authors' suggestions for increasing anxiety begin with the in-
terrogation room, which should be free of any small objects that the 
suspect might fumble with as a tension-relieving activity. Such activ-
ity "can detract from the effectiveness of the interrogation, especially 
during the critical phase when a guilty person may be trying desper-
ately to suppress an urge to confess" (p. 29). Similarly, because smok-
ing may relieve tension or "bolster . . . resistance to an effective 
interrogation," the room should be free of ashtrays. Moreover, the 
a reading can help make sense of Miranda, it destroys the case's legitimacy as constitutional law. 
See Grano, supra note 11. 
39. 384 U.S. at 469. 
40. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 280-81 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
41. Semantic precision is important here. If we are talking about "a right of silence," the 
concept of waiver makes sense: by agreeing to talk, the suspect waives his right of silence. While 
Miranda does make reference to such a right, the passage under discussion in the text, which is 
truer to the constitutional language, speaks of the defendant's right not to be "compelled" to 
become a witness against himself. If custodial interrogation very quickly can "overbear the will" 
of a suspect, even one warned of a right not to answer, then the Court's waiver doctrine permits 
the suspect to waive his right to be free of such overbearing pressure. One can put this in per-
spective by imagining such a waiver doctrine with regard to torture. 
Miranda's supporters may be tempted immediately to switch from a "compulsion" argument 
to a "right of silence" argument. In reality, the latter right does not exist. See text at notes 121-
22 infra. 
42. 384 U.S. at 468. 
43. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text. 
44. See text at note 27 supra. 
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interrogator should discourage smoking by abstaining himself and by 
suggesting, if a request is made, that the suspect wait until he leaves 
the room (p. 38). Likewise, chairs that induce slouching or leaning 
back are "psychologically undesirable" (p. 30). The interrogator 
should sit about four or five feet away from the suspect, with no furni-
ture in between them. "Sitting or standing a long distance away or the 
presence of an obstruction of any sort . . . affords a guilty suspect a 
certain degree of relief and confidence not otherwise attainable" (p. 
37). 
The emphasis on increasing anxiety is evident throughout the 
book. The authors suggest that someone other than the interrogator 
should escort the suspect into the interrogation room, direct him to 
the appropriate chair, and provide him the name of the person who 
will be talking to him. This formal identification procedure "tends to 
heighten the apprehension of a guilty suspect by reason of the appar-
ent exalted status of the interrogator"; it also tends to diminish the 
suspect's confidence in his ability to evade detection (p. 37). After 
about five minutes, the interrogator should enter deliberately and with 
"an air of confidence." Emulating a busy medical specialist, the inter-
rogator should be polite but professional. If the suspect offers his 
hand, the interrogator should respond with a "very casual hand-
shake"; otherwise the interrogator should offer a brief greeting without 
shaking hands (p. 84). The preliminaries over, the interrogator's first 
step, at least with suspects whose guilt seems reasonably certain, 
should be a direct, positive statement, expressed in a "slow, deliberate, 
and confident manner," that the police believe the suspect committed 
the offense (pp. 84-85). Psychologically, this "tends to shatter the 
well-developed network of defense mechanisms that the suspect has 
established since committing the crime" (p. 345). 
As the interrogation proceeds, the interrogator should increase the 
suspect's feelings of uneasiness about lying and prevent occurrences 
that would enable the suspect to regain confidence. If the suspect be-
gins to cry, the interrogator should not leave the suspect alone to "cry 
it out," for "the suspect who is given that opportunity may fortify 
himself and return to the denial stage" (p. 164). Because the interro-
gator must not permit role reversal to occur, he should correct a sus-
pect who attempts to flatter the interrogator by inflating his title (p. 
120). The interrogator must make "every discreet effort" to prevent 
repeated denials of the crime, for this "deprives the guilty suspect of 
the psychological fortification that would be derived from repetitious 
disclaimers of guilt" (pp. 142-43). 
The critical stage of the interrogation occurs when the suspect ex-
periences tension between an "aroused impulse to confess" and his 
perception of the consequences of confessing. At this point, if the sus-
pect regains his composure, the gains of the interrogator's prior efforts 
674 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:662 
will be lost (p. 159). The interrogator should now move his chair 
closer: "This will decrease the suspect's confidence while simultane-
ously increasing anxiety" (pp. 159-60). The interrogator should move 
in small increments without stopping the conversation or losing eye 
contact: "A guilty suspect will usually be aware of an increased feel-
ing of uneasiness as the interrogator moves closer but often will not 
consciously recognize that the cause for it is the physical proximity of 
the interrogator. The suspect simply senses or perceives that lying is 
becoming more uncomfortable" (p. 161). 
The authors do impose limits on what "a professionally skilled and 
ethical interrogator" (p. 129) may do to increase the suspect's anxiety. 
Although the interrogator must be patient and persistent, conveying 
the impression that he has "all the time in the world," he may not 
engage in "unreasonably long interrogations" (pp. 195-96).45 Like-
wise, while the interrogator should confront the suspect with belief in 
his guilt, he should not extend an accusation "beyond the point where 
mental distress becomes a reasonable probability" (p. 93). The inter-
rogator should avoid anger and personal involvement, for interroga-
tion "should be strictly a professional undertaking" (p. 195). The 
authors do endorse the "friendly-unfriendly" act when other tech-
niques of sympathy and understanding have failed, but during the un-
friendly episode the interrogator may resort only to verbal 
condemnation of the suspect; "under no circumstances should physi-
cal abuse or threats of abuse or other mistreatment ever be employed" 
(pp. 151-53). Indeed, as the appendix explains, the concept of increas-
ing the suspect's anxiety refers only to "the suspect's internal feelings 
of uneasiness as a result of his own cognitive dissonance"; it is not 
intended to suggest "use of any threats, coercion, or abuse to the sus-
pect" (p. 332). 
As with tactics designed to outsmart the suspect, distinctions can 
be made in terms of perceived offensiveness among tactics designed to 
increase the suspect's anxiety. The point remains, however, that all 
such tactics, whether or not "offensive," are intended to increase the 
pressure - the compulsion - on the suspect to confess. The "inher-
ent compulsion" of custodial interrogation would be present if an un-
trained, uniformed officer questioned the suspect in the stationhouse 
receiving room.46 The professional interrogator, with his anxiety-in-
ducing tactics, is employed precisely because the inherent pressures of 
custodial interrogation usually are insufficient by themselves to pro-
45. The authors suggest that a skillful interrogator rarely will need more than four hours to 
obtain a confession. P. 310. 
46. In the authors' view, "[t]he principal psychological factor contributing to a successful 
interrogation is privacy." P. 24. The authors condemn interrogation efforts that occur with large 
numbers of spectators present. Pp. 24-28. 
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duce the desired confession. If they were sufficient, the who and how 
of police interrogation would not be the subject of a manual. 
The tension, therefore, between the authors' book and Miranda's 
premises is inescapable. If orchestrated properly, the warnings and 
waiver will occur not simply in the inherently compelling atmosphere 
of the stationhouse but in a room purposefully designed to increase the 
suspect's anxiety.47 While those who invoke their Miranda rights will 
be spared the inherent pressures of questioning, their luckless counter-
parts who decide to match wits with the police will be subject to pres-
sures that make the inherent compulsion of a simple question, such as 
"Where were you last night?,"48 pale by comparison. If we take seri-
ously Miranda's reasoning, we should not feel comfortable with the 
authors' "professional interrogator." Conversely, if we approve the 
authors' goal of training professionals for successful interrogation, we 
should be candid in recognizing our disapproval of Miranda's prem-
ises. Without hypocrisy, we cannot have it both ways. 
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE PREMISES OF MODERN 
CONFESSIONS LAW 
The authors' suggested tactics are based upon the empirical claim 
that because self-condemnation and self-destruction are abnormal, 
criminal offenders "ordinarily do not utter unsolicited, spontaneous 
confessions" (p. xvi). This proposition is not controversial.49 Simi-
larly, a police officer rarely will obtain a confession by lecturing the 
suspect about morality, providing him pencil and paper, and trusting 
that the suspect's conscience will compel the truth (p. xvii). It neces-
sarily follows that if confessions are viewed as desirable and impor-
tant, police interrogation must be recognized as a legitimate 
institution. It also follows, just as necessarily, that permissible police 
interrogation must include tactics designed both to outsmart the sus- · 
pect and to put pressure on him to confess: 
If interrogation is the undoing of deception, what are the elements of 
deception that can be undone or influenced? To answer this question it 
is useful to evaluate why a person chooses to confess. An individual will 
confess (tell the truth) when he perceives the consequences of a confes-
sion as more desirable than the continued anxiety of deception. If, on 
the other hand, the consequences of the confession are perceived as less 
desirable than the anxiety associated with deception, the individual will 
continue to lie. . . . The goal of interrogation, therefore, is to decrease 
47. The authors condemn the giving of premature Miranda warnings. Pp. 224-25. 
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White thought that it defied 
common sense to suggest that an unwarned response to such a question was compelled. 384 U.S. 
at 533-34. 
49. Cf Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160-61 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (volun-
tary confession is not voluntary "in the sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one's soul of 
a sense of guilt"). 
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the suspect's perception of the consequences of confessing, while at the 
same time increasing the suspect's internal anxiety associated with his 
deception .... [p. 332]so 
The above, of course, does not resolve the debate, for the option of 
disfavoring confessions remains. The tension in existing confessions 
law can be resolved either by rejecting the premises of Escobedo and 
Miranda or by taking these premises seriously and accepting their con-
sequences. Forced to choose, many would prefer the logical ramifica-
tions of Escobedo and Miranda over a system that permits a 
professional interrogator to take advantage of an uncounseled sus-
pect. 51 Of course, others may counterclaim that confessions are es-
sential to the task of solving crime (p. xiv). As a matter of hard 
reality, this counterclaim seems difficult to refute, and it may explain 
the "compromise" that the status quo reflects: the Miranda Court, 
though perhaps desiring to go further, may have believed it impracti-
cal to do so.52 Nevertheless, such practical compromises ultimately 
are unsatisfactory, for they are built upon intellectual dishonesty.53 
We should confront directly whether good reasons exist to support the 
premises of Escobedo and Miranda. In my view, we have not taken 
the premises of these cases seriously because they are fundamentally 
unsound. 
A. The Argument for Permitting the Interrogator To Outsmart 
the Suspect 
Escobedo 's premises provoke some difficult questions. Why should 
the law be concerned that Escobedo admitted involvement in a homi-
cide without realizing that this was as damaging as an admission that 
he fired the fatal shots?54 Why was the Court concerned that the 
"entire thrust" ofEscobedo's interrogation was to put him "in such an 
50. Unless the perceived consequences of confessing are reduced and anxiety is increased, the 
suspect will not confess. P. 342. The authors emphasize throughout that they oppose tactics that 
would increase the risk of an innocent person confessing. P. xiv. Also, the police may not reduce 
the perceived consequences of confessing by making promises of leniency. Pp. 196-97. As de· 
scribed earlier in this essay, the interrogator aims to reduce the perceived consequences of con· 
fessing by offering a "theme" that suggests a moral excuse for the offender's behavior. See text at 
notes 28-29 supra. 
51. Although he states that Miranda required enough things "at one gulp," Professor 
Kamisar also has stated that "a rule that a suspect needs counsel to waive counsel is by no means 
unthinkable." Y. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 47 n.11. It is clear that Professor Kamisar would 
eliminate confessions before he would reconsider Miranda. See id. at 222-23 (suggesting the need 
to go further than Miranda), 59-64 (rejecting the argument that confessions are essential to suc-
cessful law enforcement). 
52. Cf. id. at 87-89 (suggesting that Miranda reflects a compromise between two competing 
positions). 
53. Cf. Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants: Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 
FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 235 (1966) (intellectual honesty would require conclusion that volun-
tary, intelligent waiver is not possible). 
54. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
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emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment"?55 
Why did the Court express concern that Escobedo's confession virtu-
ally assured his conviction for the crime?56 Stated more directly, why 
should we not rejoice that Escobedo's lack of intelligence, rational 
judgment, or sophistication enabled the police to obtain reliable evi-
dence to prove his guilt? Why would we prefer to increase the likeli-
hood that defendants like Escobedo will prevail over their 
interrogators and thereby increase their chance of winning erroneous 
acquittals at trial?57 
No reasonable person who accepts the basic legitimacy of society 
and its laws can endorse the view that a guilty suspect, like a fox dur-
ing a hunt, must be given a sporting chance to escape conviction and 
punishment.58 Eschewing sporting theory terminology, many courts 
and commentators nevertheless express dismay that the suspect is on 
an "unequal footing with his interrogators."59 Reduced to its essen-
tials, however, the desire for equality between the suspect and interro-
gator reflects the same sporting theory that the commentators 
carefully avoid.60 To advocate such equality is to express indiffer-
ence, if not actual hostility, to the likelihood of police success in the 
interrogation process. Were ascertainment of truth the desideratum, 
inequality would be a concern only to the extent it created a risk of a 
false confession. Equality between contestants makes for good sports, 
but in a criminal investigation we should be seeking truth rather than 
entertainment. 61 
It should be apparent that 'the desire for equality between the sus-
pect and the interrogator is not a reason for limiting interrogation but 
rather a conclusion itself in need of justification. Echoing Escobedo, 
55. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465 (discussing Escobedo). 
56. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text. 
57. In attempting to answer these questions, I am drawing on a currently unpublished talk, 
Police Interrogation and Confessions: A Rebuttal to Misconceived Objections, which I delivered 
on February 10, 1986, at the New York University School of Law Center for Research in Crime 
and Justice. 
58. Bentham was especially critical of what he labeled the "fox-hunter's" argument for ex-
cluding evidence. See 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 238 (1827); 7 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 454 (Bowring ed. 1843); see also Caplan, supra note 23, at 1441-
43 (arguing that Escobedo embraced a sporting theory of justice). 
59. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962); see also, e.g., White, supra note 17, at 604 
(criticizing police trickery because of the "relative strengths of the suspect and the police in this 
context"). 
60. The adversary model, which depends on the parties for the development of evidence, 
requires relatively even resources at trial because inequality increases the risk of inaccuracy. 
Assuming, however, as the authors insist, that we prohibit police tactics that are likely to induce 
an innocent person to confess, the concern for accuracy does not demand equality between a 
suspect and police interrogator. Indeed, equality in the police station, unlike equality at trial, 
impedes the discovery of tru!h. 
61. Unfortunately, "[p]rofessionals sometimes give the appearance of believing that proce-
dure was created for their special interests, not least to provide the entertainment of a fascinating 
play." Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 724 (1942). 
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some commentators have argued that the suspect needs equality in the 
police station "to protect his chances at the forthcoming trial."62 Un-
fortunately, to justify this latter goal, one must again fall back on a 
sporting theory. A system committed to ascertainment of truth would 
not value for its own sake the goal of giving guilty defendants some 
chance to escape conviction. Of course, the rules of procedure some-
times purposely increase the risk of erroneous acquittal because of our 
special abhorrence of erroneous conviction. 63 It is one thing, how-
ever, to increase a guilty defendant's chances of acquittal at trial to 
serve some overriding goal, such as protection of the innocent; it is 
another to do so when no such other goal exists. In any event, the 
purpose of pretrial investigation is to develop an airtight case against 
the offender. Nowhere, except in the rhetoric of confessions law, does 
the law reflect anxiety that the investigation may be too successful and 
thus deny the defendant a chance for acquittal at trial. 
The argument for suspect-interrogator equality cannot be so easily 
dismissed when it is made on moral grounds. Professor Schulhofer, 
for example, has argued that police manipulation of the suspect is 
morally offensive: • 
The voluntariness test ostensibly took account of special weaknesses of 
the person interrogated, but because it did permit the use of substantial 
pressures, suspects who were ignorant of their rights, unsophisticated 
about police practices and court procedures, easily dominated, or other-
wise psychologically vulnerable were more likely to be on the losing end 
of a successful police interrogation .... [T]he point [is] simply that we do 
(and should) find it unseemly for government officials systematically to 
seek out and take advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities of a citi-
zen. Whether or not one considers such tactics necessary for effective 
law enforcement, they convey a feeling of manipulation and exploitation 
of the weak by the powerful that many would tolerate with at best con-
siderable reluctance. 64 
Similarly, Professor Greenawalt has maintained that tactics that 
"make rational, responsible choice more difficult," such as playing on 
a suspect's weaknesses or deceiving the suspect about crucial facts (for 
example, whether a confederate has confessed), do not accord with 
"autonomy and dignity."65 
62. White, supra note 17, at 593. Professor Dix has argued "that a person confessing [should 
be] afforded the same opportunities as a person pleading guilty who has not previously con· 
fessed." Dix, supra note 26, at 330. 
63. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
constitutionally required). The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt increases the 
number of mistaken verdicts in the interest of protecting the innocent. C. McCORMICK, McCOR· 
MICK ON EVIDENCE 962 (3d ed. 1984). 
64. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 871-72 (1981) (footnote 
omitted). 
65. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 40-41; see also Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supra note 17, at 
42 n.174; White, supra note 17, at 627-28. 
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Of course, as discussed above, if such manipulation is morally of-
fensive, police interrogation should be abolished, for few suspects will 
confess unless rational, responsible choice is made more difficult. This 
is the point of the authors' book. As Professor Schulhofer observed in 
the above quotation, however, such a practical concern does not seem 
to address the moral issue. The more powerful response is that soci-
ety's morality does not dictate such conclusions. Confessions law .will 
begin to make sense only when we have the courage to rebut such 
moral claims without hedge or apology. In the context of police inter-
rogation, it simply is not morally offensive to "take advantage of the 
psychological vulnerabilities of a citizen."66 
Debate about morality often is unsatisfactory. Professor Dix, for 
example, has stated that the issue of police interrogation tactics "is not 
. . . susceptible to logical debate or empirical inquiry and thus is a 
matter that must be resolved according to an intuitive definition of 
human dignity. " 67 This relativistic approach, however, concedes too 
much to those who find the tactics of successful interrogation im-
moral. If the Constitution or morality condemned manipulation and 
deception, the legal system would have to prohibit altogether practices 
such as wiretapping and the use of informants. These practices do not 
give the suspect a rational choice between silence and self-damaging 
admissions, nor do they ensure that his admissions will be made "with 
as complete an understanding of his tactical position as possible."68 
From a comparative standpoint, these practices do not seem more re-
spectful of "autonomy and dignity" than the ordinary tactics of police 
interrogation. In Hoffa v. United States, 69 for example, the inform-
ant, Partin, certainly manipulated and exploited Jimmy Hoffa as much 
as custodial interrogation would have done; 70 indeed, direct rather 
than surreptitious interrogation at least would have alerted Hoffa to 
the risk of trickery and deceit. Of course, the police often employ 
wiretapping and informants before they take the suspect into custody, 
but the fact of custody does not seem relevant to the moral question of 
inappropriate exploitation. 
It may be countered at this point that the analogy to wiretapping 
and the use of informants begs the question, for these practices also 
may be morally offensive.71 Such a claim, however, is counterintui-
66. Schulhofer, supra note 64, at 872. The authors weaken their case by arguing that both 
"fair" and "unfair" practices are acceptable in police interrogation. P. xvii. The better argument 
is that the authors' suggested tactics are not unfair in this context. 
67. Dix, supra note 26, at 336. 
68. Id. at 330-31. 
69. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
70. See 385 U.S. at 294-300 {detailing how Partin deceived and manipulated Hoffa). 
71. Cf Skolnick, Deception by Police, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1982, at 40, 41-42 
(suggesting that police deception in the investigatory stages may breed a willingness to commit 
perjury). 
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tive, and it does not comport with society's morality as reflected in its 
law. While limits exist, such as in the law of entrapment,72 trickery 
and deception as weapons in the arsenal of law enforcement have a 
long history of approval. Indeed, even outside of law enforcement, 
lying and deception always have been difficult issues that still lack cat-
egorical answers. 73 While commentators such as Schulhofer may be 
in the vanguard of a new morality, they clearly are not in step with 
either the past or present thinking of our society. Moreover, it must be 
remembered that the moral issue in the law of confessions arises in a 
constitutional context. The argument for imposing through constitu-
tional dictate a minority morality, rooted neither in history nor tradi-
tion, is not apparent. 
In considering the moral issue, it also is appropriate to recall that 
while the police often use informants to develop probable cause, custo-
dial interrogation typically occurs after a lawful arrest supported by 
probable cause. "The subjects of such interrogation, therefore, cannot 
be presumed innocent in a literal sense but instead must be viewed as 
persons justifiably subject to certain state restraints and inconve-
niences that otherwise would not be acceptable."74 In the authors' 
words, many situations exist in which the "public welfare requires re-
linquishment of some personal comfort or even a sacrifice of a measure 
of protection from governmental intrusion" (p. 91). I have made the 
same point previously in another context: 
Legal scholars have constructed various "models" to describe the 
criminal justice system. These models, often couched in loaded terms, 
include the due process model, the crime control model, and even the 
family model. . . . In thinking about the criminal justice system, we need 
a renewed commitment to the common law view that the individual can-
not live in isolation, oblivious to the community's needs. One who 
shares the benefits of community living may legitimately be expected to 
make reasonable sacrifices on behalf of the community's efforts to solve 
and control crime.75 
This may seem excessively utilitarian, but assessment of the commu-
nity's interests must inform to some extent moral evaluations of gov-
ernmental conduct. 
None of this is to deny that constitutional and moral limits exist on 
what an interrogator may do to outwit a suspect. As previously dis-
cussed, deception is not acceptable when it is likely to induce a false 
72. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (taking a narrow view of the entrap· 
ment defense). 
73. For recent attempts to treat the subject, sees. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 54-78 (1978). 
74. Grano, supra note 33, at 902 (footnote omitted). 
75. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 497 (1984); cf Caplan, supra note 23, at 1454 (questioning how human 
dignity is advanced when a suspect maintains silence in the face of justifiable accusation). 
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confession (p. 216). Likewise, it would not be acceptable for an inter-
rogator to induce a confession by making a false promise of leniency76 
or by posing as a jail chaplain or defense lawyer (pp. 216-17). That 
some trickery and deception are morally acceptable does not mean 
that "some extreme version of the battle model"77 governs the inves-
tigatory process. Whether viewed in terms of what shocks the con-
science, as the authors state it (p. 216), or in terms of moral principles 
"rooted ... in history or in widely shared contemporary morality," as 
I once stated it, 78 some interrogation tactics exceed the bounds of 
moral tolerance. The line between the acceptable and the unaccept-
able sometimes may be difficult to draw, but this should not count as a 
reason for throwing the baby out with the bath. 
The moral argument against successful interrogation tactics some-
times is varied to express a concern about equality among suspects. 
Professor Greenawalt, for example, has complained that tactics such 
as deception "work unevenly by undermining the inexperienced and 
ignorant [while] having little effect on the hardened criminal."79 This 
argument does not have merit. The inexperienced and ignorant suffer 
disadvantages at every turn: they are more apt to leave clues at the 
crime scene, less likely to take precautions against wiretapping and 
informants, and more likely to be caught in deception by skillful cross-
examination at trial. In any event, the ability of the sophisticated 
criminal to escape conviction and punishment hardly counts as a legit-
imate argument for providing others similar means of escape. In Pro-
fessor Robinson's words, "[t]here seems to be no justifiable end in 
equal acquittal of the guilty."80 It should follow that the moral ac-
ceptability of police tactics does not depend upon an equal distribution 
of success. 
Concededly, the argument for equality among defendants has more 
force if the concern is unequal distribution of legal rights. If, for ex-
ample, all defendants have a right to counsel during police interroga-
tion, exercise of the right should not depend upon preexisting 
knowledge, which only the rich or sophisticated may have. The pur-
76. Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (due process violated by failure to keep 
promise that induced guilty plea). 
77. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 41. 
78. Grano, supra note 33, at 918-19. 
79. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 41 (footnote omitted). 
80. Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo, and Rationales for the Exclusion of Co11fessio11s, 56 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 412, 421 (1965) (footnote omitted); see also Caplan, 
supra note 23, at 1456-58; Grano, supra note 33, at 914-15; Inbau, Over-Reaction-The Mischief 
a/Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797, 808-09 (1982); Letter from Attor-
ney General Nicholas Katzenbach to Judge David Bazelon (June 24, 1965), reprinted in 
Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind?-the Bazelo11-Katze11bach Letters 011 
Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 KY. L.J. 461, 490-94 (1966) 
(questioning why the gangster should be the model and all others raised, in the name of equality, 
to the same level of success in suppressing evidence). 
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pose of the analysis to this point, however, has been to determine what 
legal rights a suspect should have. Escobedo premised a right to coun-
sel on reasons that this essay has attempted to show lack merit. If 
Escobedo 's reasoning is found wanting, its right to counsel is left with-
out justification. Thus, the equality argument is needed to support the 
right to counsel. To attempt now to premise the equality argument on 
a preexisting right to counsel is to engage in circular reasoning. 
All else having failed, the temptation will arise to insist that the 
Constitution itself is the justification for the right to counsel. This, of 
course, is a makeweight argument. If the Constitution spoke in un-
mistakable terms, the Court in Escobedo would not have been com-
pelled to offer reasons for applying the right to counsel to the police 
station. While the sixth amendment guarantees the assistance of coun-
sel in "all criminal prosecutions,"81 the applicability of this right to 
the investigatory stages of the criminal process is not self-evident from 
the text. This is why the emphasis on underlying theoretical justifica-
tion is necessary. 82 
No more than its textual language, the sixth amendmenfs history 
does not support its extension to protect a suspect from the investiga-
tory process. The right to counsel evolved on the battleground of the 
criminal trial; it sprang from complaints that a defendant without 
counsel's assistance could not adequately defend himself in court 
against legal charges. 83 The use of counsel to shield the defendant 
from detection is fundamentally different, and is not supported by the 
history of the right to counsel. 84 As I have shown in another article, 
precedent also did not support the Court's extension of the right to 
counsel to shield a suspect from the discovery of incriminating evi-
dence. 85 The only remaining justification for so extending the right to 
counsel is policy. I have attempted to demonstrate in this essay, how-
ever, that we do not have good reasons for injecting counsel as an 
obstacle to successful police interrogation. To the contrary, as the au-
thors maintain, we have sound reasons for permitting the police, 
within limits, to employ interrogation tactics designed to outwit the 
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
82. Cf. Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1298-99 (1983) (making 
a similar argument with regard to the first amendment). 
83. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. 
REV. 1175, 1190-92 (1970). 
84. See Grano, supra note 33, at 943. I previously have defended application of sixth amend-
ment rights to investigatory procedures once adversary, judicial proceedings have commenced. 
See id. at 942-44; Grano, supra note 19, at 18-31. This is the Court's current view. See note 19 
supra. I now have doubts whether the sixth amendment's "shield" function is appropriate at any 
stage of the process. 
85. See Grano, supra note 19, at 19 n.117. The Constitution still does not provide a right to 
counsel during questioning by an investigative grand jury. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 
564 (1976). 
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suspect.86 
B. The Argument for Permitting Some Pressure To Confess 
The above discussion, though adequate in terms of Escobedo 's rea-
soning, has not taken account of the fifth amendment concerns that 
informed Miranda. Even if we lack good reasons for assisting the sus-
pect to make informed, intelligent decisions, limitations on police in-
terrogation may be defended as necessary to protect the suspect's right 
not to be compelled to become a witness against himself. Similarly, 
even if Escobedo 's reasoning does not support a right to counsel, such 
a right, as Miranda concluded, may be defensible in the interest of 
protecting fifth amendment rights. My purpose now is to show that 
Miranda's premises are equally as unsound as Escobedo's. 
The first step to sound analysis is to recognize that, despite the 
frequent incantation of the phrase, no "privilege against self-incrimi-
nation" exists in our law. Because the fifth amendment protects only 
testimonial or communicative evidence, the state may compel a person 
to produce self-incriminating physical evidence. 87 More fundamen-
tally for present purposes, the fifth amendment protects not against 
self-incrimination but against the state compelling a person to be a wit-
ness against himself. 88 Absent compulsion, a self-incriminating ad-
mission is not presumptively suspicious. "Indeed, far from being 
prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if 
not coerced, are inherently desirable."89 Finally, unlike true privi-
leges that protect the privacy of communications, the fifth amendment 
"privilege" is not concerned at all with securing a zone of privacy for 
the individual, for with a grant of immunity, the state can compel the 
individual to tell all regardless of how embarrassing disclosure may 
be.9o 
Because confessions are testimonial evidence intended for use in 
the criminal trial, the fifth amendment issue turns on the concept of 
compulsion. What does it mean to compel a person to be a witness 
86. In one of their most colorful examples, the authors describe how an interrogator called 
his secretary into the interrogation room where one suspect was being questioned, leaving a co-
suspect alone in the waiting room. Thereafter, the secretary returned to the waiting room and 
began typing, ostensibly from the note pad she had taken into the interrogation room. She even 
paused to ask the co-suspect how the suspect in the interrogation room spelled his name. When 
the interrogator subsequently called the co-suspect in for interrogation, he had little trouble ob-
taining the confession. Why we would want to protect guilty suspects from such brilliant trick-
ery escapes me. 
87. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967) (handwriting sample); Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966) (blood sample); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391, 396-401 (1976) (subpoena for documents). 
88. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-77 (1976) (search for incriminating docu-
ments); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). 
89. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977). 
90. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
684 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:662 
against himself? Historically, compulsion was nothing more than the 
requirement, under penalty of law, that the individual respond to 
questions under oath.91 This requirement subjected the individual to 
"the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."92 Such 
legal compulsion, with its concomitant trilemma, is not present in the 
stationhouse, and powerful arguments have been made, though they 
lately have been ignored, that the fifth amendment simply has nothing 
to do with the issue of police interrogation.93 Semantically, of course, 
it is virtually impossible for the Supreme Court to reverse its position 
on this. One can imagine the reaction were the Court to rule that the 
Constitution no longer prohibits the police from compelling a custo-
dial suspect to incriminate himself. Realistically, therefore, we are left 
with the task of defining compulsion in the context of police 
interrogation. 
Mere questioning by itself is not equivalent to compulsion. Thus, a 
grand jury may question even a target of its investigation, and the tar-
get must invoke the right not to answer incriminating questions.94 
Similarly, although the police have no authority to insist on answers 
outside the custodial context,95 a person subject to noncustodial ques-
tioning must assert the right not to answer. Absent a claim that the 
interrogator has a right to an answer, to question is not to compel. 
Because compulsion in the context of police interrogation refers 
neither to legal compulsion nor to the mere fact of questioning, it can 
be understood only as a synonym for coercion. That is, the fifth 
amendment in this context protects a person from being coerced to 
become a witness against himself. This, of course, is precisely what 
the due process voluntariness cases protected against. Professor 
Kamisar may rail against those who view the fifth amendment in the 
police station as "little, if anything, more than the 'voluntary' test 
masquerading under a different label,"96 but it cannot be anything 
more. While the meaning of coercion may differ for due process and 
91. Grano, supra note 33, at 926-28 & n.347; see also Y. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 36-37 
(but finding this an unpersuasive reason for not applying the fifth amendment to the police 
station). 
92. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 (1976) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
93. See, e.g., 3 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OP EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 823 at 250 n.5 (3d ed. 1940);seealso id. at§§ 817-20, 823 
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); 8 id. §§ 2250, 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But see Y. KAMISAR, 
supra note 13, at 36-37 (fifth amendment's "tangled and obscure history" permits, although it 
does not dictate, its application to the police station). 
94. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 
564 (1976). 
95. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 
(1976). 
96. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 67. 
February-April 1986] Interrogation and Confessions 685 
fifth amendment purposes, both doctrines necessarily address the same 
evil. 
The difficulty lies in determining when permissible pressure shades 
into coercion or "compulsion." Professor Kamisar lias attempted to 
provide an answer: 
It has been said that "there are a thousand forms of compulsion" and 
that "our police show great ingenuity in the variety employed." But "a 
confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have 
been the character of the compulsion." If the police conduct is designed 
and likely to pressure or persuade, or even "to exert a tug on" a suspect 
to incriminate himself ... then that conduct is "compulsion" as Miranda 
defines the self-incrimination clause. Then it augments or intensifies the 
tolerable level of stress, confusion, and anxiety generated by unadulter-
ated arrest and detention to the impermissible level of "compulsion."97 
A confession must be excluded "whatever may have been the charac-
ter of the compulsion"? A tactic imposes "compulsion" even if it 
merely exerts "a tug" on the suspect? If Professor Kamisar is correct, 
everything the authors recommend in their book is "compulsion." 
But is Kamisar correct? Does even he really believe these claims? 
Professor Kamisar acknowledges that "[d]istinguishing degrees ... 
is inherent in the process of defining 'compel.' "98 While acknowledg-
ing that all police questioning, whether custodial or not, generates 
some pressure, he candidly concedes that the fifth amendment does 
not protect against all pressure. 99 Indeed, Professor Kamisar has 
stated forthrightly that "[z]ero-value pressure conditions" are impossi-
ble to attain. 100 If the definition of "compel" is a matter of degree, 101 
some justification is needed for defining the word in the way Miranda 
did and Kamisar would. Recognizing that the fifth amendment does 
not prohibit the pressure generated by the officer's badge in the non-
custodial context, we need to ask why it should prohibit the inherent 
pressure of custodial questioning or even the pressures generated by 
the authors' tactics. Stated differently, only a policy analysis can pro-
vide the appropriate definition of compulsion. 
An expansive view of "compulsion" cannot be premised on a dis-
97. Id. at 160 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). 
98. Id. at 42 n.2. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 155 n.20. 
10 I. Of course, the definition of "compel" must be a matter of degree. Kamisar is right that 
zero-value pressure simply is impossible. On the other hand, no matter how great the pressure, 
an undrugged, conscious person always can choose to endure. Thus, unless the issue is seen as 
one of degree, either all statements are coerced or none are. From a legal perspective, neither 
alternative is satisfactory. Words like "compel,'' "coerce," and "voluntary," therefore, must 
draw their meaning from policy considerations, and their meaning accordingly should vary in 
different legal contexts. Grano, supra note 33, at 862-63, 880-86. Try as we may, we cannot 
escape Justice Harlan's insight that the question must be "how much pressure on the suspect [is] 
permissible." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 507, 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also note 36 supra and 
accompanying text. 
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like of self-incriminating statements. As discussed in the last section 
of this essay, our morality approves interrogation tactics, including 
trickery and deception, intended to convince a suspect to confess. 
Moreover, as noted above, the fifth amendment does not provide pro-
tection against self-incrimination as such.102 If we prefer that sus-
pects tell the truth - if, that is, we prefer the police to succeed with 
interrogation - we should not define compulsion so as to eliminate all 
"tugs" on the suspect to confess. The Supreme Court itself has recog-
nized that the fifth amendment does not require such protection: 
The Constitution does not prohibit every element which influences a 
criminal suspect to make incriminating admissions. Of course, for many 
witnesses the grand jury room engenders an atmosphere conducive to 
truthtelling, for it is likely that upon being brought before such a body of 
neighbors and fellow citizens, and having been placed under a solemn 
oath to tell the truth, many witnesses will feel obliged to do just that. 
But it does not offend the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment if in that 
setting a witness is more likely to tell the truth than in less solemn sur-
roundings. The constitutional guarantee is only that the witness not be 
compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. 103 
The policies underlying the fifth amendment do not suggest that 
we should protect the defendant from either the inherent pressures of 
custodial interrogation or the authors' anxiety-inducing tactics. The 
protection embodied in the fifth amendment arose in the midst of 
stormy political controversies concerning the English church courts 
and the Star Chamber.104 We cannot be sure whether this protection 
developed as a tactical weapon against these institutions or whether it 
had its own independent justifications. The justifications we typically 
see today are largely after-the-event formulations. 105 For this reason, 
they deserve especially careful scrutiny. 
In Miranda, the Court stated that the "one overriding thought" 
underlying the fifth amendment "is the respect a government ... must 
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."106 As discussed in 
the previous section of this essay, however, our morality does not con-
sider the tactics of successful interrogation an affront to human dig-
nity. Miranda also indicated that the fifth amendment seeks to 
maintain a "fair state-individual balance" and to require the govern-
ment "to shoulder the entire load."107 The concept of fairness, how-
102. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text. 
103. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88 (1977) (citations omitted, emphasis 
in original). 
104. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968). 
105. For an exhaustive review of possible underlying policies, see McNaughton, The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscel/aneous Im-
plications, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 223 (C. Sowle ed. 1962). 
106. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. 
107. 384 U.S. at 460 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE (McNaughton rev.), supra note 93, at 317). 
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ever, like the concept of dignity, requires analysis. The previous 
section argued that our morality does not consider it "unfair" for the 
state to succeed in obtaining a confession or a conviction. Likewise, 
only a sporting theory of justice could favor equality between the sus-
pect and the state for its own sake. 108 It also is fiction to say that our 
legal system requires the government to shoulder the entire load. .We 
require the defendant to stand in lineups for identification, to provide 
fingerprints, blood, and handwriting samples, to submit to psychiatric 
examinations, to provide pretrial discovery of certain defenses and wit-
nesses, and sometimes even to respond to subpoenas for documents. 109 
We also permit grand juries to subpoena targets of their investiga-
tions.110 Of coursek one may attempt to distinguish these practices 
from police interrogation. The point remains, however, that in defin-
ing the concept of compulsion, the old saw that the government must 
bear the entire load does not provide assistance, for it simply is not 
true. 
Miranda also drew support from the aphorism that ours is an ac-
cusatorial system of justice.111 This, however, is no more true than the 
proposition that the government must bear the entire load. Indeed, if 
our system did not have both accusatorial and inquisitorial attributes, 
the investigative grand jury and the other procedures mentioned in the 
previous paragraph would not"be possible. Because we in fact have a 
mixed system of justice, 112 the question cannot be whether police in-
terrogation is inquisitorial, which it is, but whether we have reasons 
for distinguishing this inquisitorial institution from the others we per-
mit in our system. 
Professor Kamisar's protests notwithstanding, good reasons do not 
exist for defining fifth amendment compulsion any differently than due 
process coercion. As a policy word, the concept of compulsion neces-
sarily must reflect society's desire, on the one hand, for successful po-
lice interrogation and society's revulsion, on the other hand, of certain 
offensive police methods.113 Only such a balancing can define the 
108. See notes 58-63 supra and accompanying text. 
109. See Grano, supra note 33, at 934 (reviewing cases). 
110. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977). 
111. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. 
112. See Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal 
Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009 (1974). The error of regarding our system as "accusatorial" 
and not "inquisitorial" is not harmless. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1148 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (building on premise that ours is an accusatorial system). 
113. See generally Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (drawing on the due process confession 
cases to define the concept of voluntary consent). In its recent Miranda cases, the Court has 
recognized these competing concerns. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1144 (1986). The 
Court has never recognized, however, that these concerns cannot properly be balanced as long as 
Miranda remains viable. 
688 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:662 
point at which the pressure to confess becomes "undue."114 To ignore 
this reality is to overlook, as even Professor Kamisar has conceded,115 
that distinguishing degrees is inherent in the process of defining the 
concept of compulsion. 
This approach to fifth amendment compulsion actually comports 
with both pre-Miranda and post-Miranda precedent. When the Court 
in the nineteenth century first suggested in a federal case that the fifth 
amendment had some bearing on police interrogation, it expressed the 
applicable test in terms of a voluntariness standard, and it declined to 
hold that either custody or questioning automatically invalidated a 
confession.116 Similarly, a fifth amendment voluntariness test con-
trolled questioning of the defendant at the preliminary examination, a 
practice that persisted in this country until the middle of the nine-
teenth century.117 When the Court first applied the fifth amendment 
to the states, it observed that the due process voluntariness doctrine in 
state confession cases reflected fifth amendment requirements. 118 
Outside the custodial context, where the fifth amendment but not Mi-
randa applies, the admissibility of confessions is governed by a volun-
tariness test. 119 Moreover, while Miranda's prophylactic rule does 
not prevent the use for impeachment purposes of a statement obtained 
in violation of Miranda, an "involuntary" statement cannot be used 
for any purpose. 120 In short, as the Court reiterated only recently, 
outside the trial context the fifth amendment has imposed only a vol-
untariness requirement: "The constitutional guarantee is only that the 
witness be not compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. The test 
is whether, considering the totality of circumstances, the free will of 
the witness was overbome."121 
The remaining question is whether the suspect's "right of silence" 
dictates greater protection than a voluntariness approach affords. If, 
as I have suggested, the first step to sound analysis is to recognize that 
no "privilege against self-incrimination" exists, the second step is to 
recognize, again despite the frequent incantations of the phrase, that 
there is no right of silence. The fifth amendment right is a right not to 
be compelled to become a witness against oneself. The right of silence 
114. See note 36 supra and accompanying text; see also Caplan, supra note 23, at 1468-76. 
115. See note 101 supra and accompanying text. 
116. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 558, 562 (1897). 
117. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 
613, 623 (1896). The practice of questioning the accused at the examination ended in the middle 
of the nineteenth century. L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFrH AMENDMENT? 16 
(1959). 
118. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964). 
119. E.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976). 
120. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
121. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (emphasis in original). 
February-April 1986] Interrogation and Confessions 689 
exists only in the limited sense that the state cannot compel a person 
to answer. 
This is not just a semantic quibble. If a right of silence as such 
existed, we could not justify protecting that right only for those in 
custody, for the fifth amendment applies to the noncustodial as well as 
the custodial suspect. Similarly, the concept of waiver would have to 
apply whenever the police engage in questioning, for any response to 
interrogaton would be a relinquishment of the "right of silence." 
Thus, if we truly recognized a right of silence, Miranda's limitation of 
its warning and waiver requirements to custodial interrogation could 
not be defended. Of course, Miranda imposed its requirements to 
combat the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, but this is 
precisely the point; Miranda's concern, despite its loose language, was 
compulsion, not a right of silence as such. If the fifth amendment 
guaranteed a right of silence, even wiretapping and the use of infor-
mants could raise troubling issues. Certainly the use of a suspect's 
silence as evidence would not be impermissible only when the police 
provided antecedent Miranda warnings. 122 
In summary, then, we have no reason to read the fifth amendment 
as prohibiting police interrogation, as protecting against the inherent 
pressure of custodial interrogation, or as prohibiting the tactics the 
authors suggest to increase the suspect's anxiety in the police station. 
The authors' tactics are inconsistent with Miranda's premises, but it is 
those premises, not their tactics, that lack persuasive justification. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I have attempted to show in this essay that the authors' suggested 
tactics for successful police interrogation are inconsistent with the two 
strands of thought that have influenced modern confessions law. I 
also have attempted to demonstrate that both of these strands of 
thought are unsound. Nothing in our Constitution or our morality 
precludes the police, within limits, from trying to outsmart the suspect 
and to increase the pressure on him to tell the truth. Indeed, our mo-
rality actually approves such interrogation efforts. 
The Supreme Court has applied the right to counsel to police inter-
rogation both to help the suspect make informed, intelligent decisions 
and to protect him from interrogation's inherent pressures. I have 
tried to show in this essay that neither justification is persuasive and 
that both run counter to the appropriate functions and goals of police 
interrogation. Of course, with unexacting waiver requirements, the 
authors' program for professional interrogation can coexist with a 
right of counsel, but only intellectual dishonesty can make such coex-
istence theoretically compatible. If my arguments against the prem-
122. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986). 
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ises of Escobedo and Miranda are persuasive, counsel should be 
barred, for all defendants, from the interrogation room. 
The law openly should permit, as the authors desire, a reasonable 
period of custodial interrogation once a suspect has been arrested on 
probable cause.123 While the police should not be permitted to assert 
that the suspect must answer their questions, they should have leeway 
to attempt to convince him to tell the truth. The law should preclude 
tactics that are likely to induce a false confession, and it likewise 
should preclude tactics that offend well-established moral principles. 
In short, whether under due process or the fifth amendment, some 
form of voluntariness test should control.124 
If we really believed in the philosophy that underlies cases like Es-
cobedo and Miranda, we would have to regard Criminal Interrogation 
and Confessions as a blueprint for police illegality. It is no such thing. 
The book is a manual for successful interrogation that a free, civilized, 
and just society can and should endorse without apology. We are in-
debted to the authors for helping to demonstrate how misguided our 
recent direction has been. 
123. Cf Proposed Mich. Ct. R. 6.104(A): "An arrested person must be taken without un-
necessary delay before a judicial officer for arraignment in accordance with the provisions of this 
rule. A delay is not "unnecessary" solely because the police interrogated the accused before 
bringing him to court." 422A Mich. 10 (1985). [The author of this review is reporter of the 
committee that submitted Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure to the Michigan Supreme 
Court. The Court has published the proposed rules for public comment.]. 
124. I previously have recommended that the Court revert to a modified voluntariness test. 
Grano, supra note 33; see also Caplan, supra note 23, at 1467-76 (arguing that Miranda should be 
overruled). 
